Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

Nadine Gilmor v. Robin Macey; Ken Macey;
Family Link, L.L.C., a Utah Limited LIability
Company; and David K. Richards & Co., a Utah
corporation : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Keith W. Meade; Cohne Rappaport and Segal; Elizabeth T. Dunning; Holme, Roberts and Owen;
Attorneys for Appellees.
David W. Scofield; Ronald F. Price; Peters, Scofield and Price; Attorneys for Appellant .
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Gilmor v. Macey and David K. Richards & Co., No. 20030368 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4325

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Nadine Gillmor,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 20030368-CA
-vsRobin Macey; Ken Macey; Family Link,
L.L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company;
and David K. Richards & Co., a Utah
corporation,
Defendants and Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT NADINE GILLMOR
AND RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF

Appeal From the Final Judgment of the Honorable Robert K. Hilder,
Dated March 31, 2003

Keith W. Meade
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL

525 East 100 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Elizabeth T. Dunning
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP

299 South Main, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263

David W.Scofield-4140
Ronald F. Price - 5535
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE
A Professional Corporation

340 Broadway Centre
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2002
Facsimile: (801) 322-2003
Attorneys for Nadine Gillmor

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
SO
.A10

DOCKET

HQ.0OQlO2><*2-C4

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

SEP 09200*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

I.

II.

III.

DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS ABOUT INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT ARE
ERRONEOUS

1

DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS ON THE CHALLENGED FINDINGS FAIL

8

A.

Findings 3 and 4

8

B.

Finding No. 18

8

C

Finding No. 23

10

D.

Finding No. 26

10

E.

Finding No. 49

11

DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF FOUR-WHEELED ATVS MUST
BE REJECTED ~ THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT FOUR-WHEELED ATVS
CANNOT BE USED ON THE EASEMENT IS NOT CORRECT
12

A.

B.

Defendants' Arguments Concerning the Trial Court's Denial of
Summary Judgment Ignore the Applicable Rules of Contract
Construction

12

Even Assuming, Arguendo, The Trial Court's Conclusion On
Summary Judgment That The Phrase At Issue Is Ambiguous
Was Correct, The Trial Court Erred When It Concluded That
The Agreement Bars The Use Of Four-Wheeled ATVs On
The Easement

13

IV.

THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO AMEND WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION

V.

THE FACT THAT CERTAIN ISSUES MAY HAVE BEEN RAISED BELOW DOES NOT MEAN
THAT THE TRIAL COURT CAN ISSUE ADVISORY OPINIONS
19

RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL
I.

II.

17

20

THE UNFETTERED GRANT OF ACCESS RUNS WITH THE LAND AND APPLIES
To NADINE GILLMOR

20

THE OCCUPANTS OF THE CABIN" WERE EXPRESSLY GRANTED AN EASEMENT. . . .

23

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE AGREEMENT
REFERS TO "HUNTERS" IS CORRECT

23

CONCLUSION

24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

25

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE

Cases:
Boyle v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.,
866 P.2d 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

19

Crescent Mfg. Co. v. Patterson Mfg. Co.,
195 F. 382 (4th Cir. 1912)

15

Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co.,
776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989)

22

In re Estate of Flake,
2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589

24

Novell, Inc. v. The Canopy Group, Inc.,
92 P.3d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)

12

Peterson v. The SunriderCorp.,
48 P.3d 918 (Utah 2002)

14

Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry,
802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990)

3

R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc.,
936 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1997)

12

Sylvester v. Armstrong,
84 P.2d 729 (Wyo. 1938)

15

The President, Directors, and Company of Hartford Bank v. Hart,
3 Day 491,
, 3 Am. Dec. 274 (Conn. 1807)

15

Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
899 P.2d 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

13

Ward v. Intermountain Farmers' Ass'n,
907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995)

14

Rules:
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)

18,19
iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Nadine Gillmor,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 20030368-CA
-vsRobin Macey; Ken Macey; Family Link,
L.L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company;
and David K. Richards & Co., a Utah
corporation,
Defendants and Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT NADINE GILLMOR
AND RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF

Appeal From the Final Judgment of the Honorable Robert K. Hilder,
Dated March 31, 2003

Keith W. Meade
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL

525 East 100 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Elizabeth T. Dunning
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP

299 South Main, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263

David W.Scofield-4140
Ronald F. Price - 5535
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE
A Professional Corporation

340 Broadway Centre
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2002
Facsimile: (801) 322-2003
Attorneys for Nadine Gillmor

ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS ABOUT INTERPRETATION O F T H E AGREEMENT A R E
ERRONEOUS.

The underpinnings of all of the Defendants' arguments concerning the legal
construction of the Agreement is that the plain language of the Agreement granted to
Gillmor, "for access to the Gillmor Property" means something different from, and far
more limited than, what it plainly says. Defendants first attempt to misconstrue
Gillmor's argument, stating: "Gillmor argues that the Agreement's reference in
paragraph 3(a) to "vehicular access (ingress and egress)" converts the easement into
an "unfettered" right of access. This is wishful thinking." Defendants' Brief, at 10.
Gillmor's reply to this argument is that the Agreement contains that grant in plain
language, so Gillmor does not contend that the Agreement has been "converted" into
anything other than what it started out as. Gillmor's position is supported by the trial
court's conclusion of law as to the plain meaning of that language, that the grant of the
Agreement to Gillmor in paragraph 3(a), for access to her property, "is unfettered by
any restriction as to the purpose for the access, and none may be imposed, except the
hunting restrictions set forth in Section 6, which apply to all users."
Defendants simply choose to ignore the plain language of the grant in paragraph
3(a) and the trial court's conclusion of law as to the scope of that grant. Instead, they
argue for a hidden meaning in the language of the Agreement, not found in its plain
words. Defendants argue that the parties "took great care to limit the rights of use
provided under paragraph 3(a)." Defendants' Brief, at 10. In making that argument,
they ignore the admission of Richards, himself, at trial, that paragraph 3(a)'s only
restriction on the access rights of the Gillmor family members, outside of the express
1

restrictions of ffij 2 and 6 of the Agreement, was that the access had to be vehicular
and, as stated by Richards, "I guess it's for a reasonable purpose, huh?" Tr. at
1050:15-1051:5 (Richards' testimony)(emphasis added).
Despite Richards* admission upon cross-examination that the grant of access in
3(a) is so broad that it is only limited by the reasonableness of any given purpose,1
Defendants attempt to convince this Court that an interpretation of paragraph 3(a) that
is consistent with its plain, broad grant of access, is somehow inconsistent with the rest
of the Agreement. They contend that the prefatory language to all of paragraph 32
somehow alters the meaning of the actual language of the broad, paragraph 3(a) grant.
But all that prefatory language does is limit the grants in paragraph 3 to those expressly
set forth in paragraph 3; and paragraph 3(a) is plainly part of paragraph 3, so whether
broad or narrow, its language means what it says, namely, it grants a right of unfettered
vehicular access to Gillmor for the purpose of accessing the Gillmor property.3
Defendants argue that paragraph 2 "describes the recipients of the easements
and limits the use of the easements to prevent rights of public access." Defendants'

1

Richards' admission is strikingly consistent with the limitations of the law on
such a broad grant, as discussed in Gillmor's Opening Brief, that any use is allowed by
such a grant so long as it does not constitute an unreasonable burden on the servient
estate. Appellant's Opening Brief at 32.
2

"The Easements herein are granted for the following purposes only and shall not
be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of Richards."
defendants contend that the language of paragraph 1, granting the Easements
"subject to the conditions and limitations herein contained[,]" serves to limit the
paragraph 3(a) grant. Again, however, paragraph 3(a) is "herein contained" and "the
conditions and limitations" of paragraph 3(a) are that the grant of access to Gillmor is
for the purpose of accessing the Gillmor property by vehicle. The language of
paragraph 1 does not counsel any restriction on the plain, broad language of the grant
in paragraph 3(a).
2

Brief at 9 That characterization of fho plain lanquaqe of pnmqrnph 7, neglects to
mention that pat agi aph 2, itself, grants an unfettered access easement to the Gillmor

for access to such cabii i." It is in the context of that unfettered right of access to the
cabin on tho -o.;;, -or property, as well as the unfettei ed i ight ol ' access to tl re Gillmor
property granted to Gillmor in paragraph 3(a) that the "public domain" restrictioi i ii i
paragraph 2 acquires meaning.
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domain" restriction of paragraph 2 would be superfluous.

4Qn cross-examination, Richards admitted that he did not have too great a
concern about the numbers of people who were going up to the Gillmor property with
Mr. Gillmoi , but was really more concerned with the Vernon Howard Group of people
who used the cabin on the Gillmor property. See Tt. at 1029:8-24 (Richards
Testimony^.
3

Finally, Defendants argue that "[n]owhere is Gillmor's misinterpretation of the
Agreement clearer than in her argument that her personal right of access includes a
right to have invitees use her easement." Defendants' Brief at 11. Macey then
postulates that paragraph 3(c) expressly deals with invitee access, but would be
rendered superfluous by Gillmor's (and the trial court's) interpretation that 3(a) grants
unfettered access. See id.
Defendants misread paragraphs 3(a) and 3(c). The two subparagraphs grant
different access rights to the Gillmor property to different grantees over two different
routes. The first route, granted to the Gillmors for access to their own property, allows
transit over and across the Perdue Creek Road to its intersection with the Neil Creek
Road in Section 30, and from that intersection Northerly along the Neil Creek Road to
the South entrance of the Gillmor property in Section 24, or around the Perdue Creek
Road to the easterly entrance to the Gillmor Property in Section 26. This access route
passes fairly close to the location of the Richards cabin in Section 30, that existed at
the time the Agreement was entered into, but does not purport to restrict invitees.
In contrast, an easement along the second route, set forth in paragraph 3(c), is
granted to only two specific categories of Gillmor invitees: (1) maintenance invitees; and
(2) hunting invitees. That access route allows transit over and across the Perdue Creek
Road to its intersection with the Neil Creek Road in Section 25 (rather than Section 30),
and from that intersection Northerly along the Neil Creek Road to the South entrance of
the Gillmor property in Section 24, or around the Perdue Creek Road to the easterly
entrance to the Gillmor Property in Section 26. This access route is distant from the
Richards' cabin in Section 30. The main point of distinction between paragraph 3(a)
and 3(c) is therefore the location of the routes, and secondarily the fact that the 3(c)
4

route is limited to maintenance am Il liiiiiiiiiiiliiiiiiii im/ilri1!:. Thni'p is thus no superfluous
language and no ambiguity created by the Agreement's plain language establishing two
sepaidh; easel in "n
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Defendants. First, there is Richards' express admission on cross-examinatioi i tl lat
the sole limitation on vehicular access under paragraph 3(a) is that the access be "for
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Agreement was not intended to restrict, in any way, the historical use of the
easements, and the facts showing that cabins had been built, recreation engaged in,

access to their property would have, Dep R Workman at 38:13 - 40:10',
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The express creation of the distant route, in paragraph 3(c) for hunting and
maintenance, that does not otherwise exist, could well minimize the disruptions to
Richards when he occupied his cabin, of a lot of noisy and dusty maintenance vehicles
or hunters, who do not have to pass by his cabin. By limiting that distant route, in
paragraph 3(c), to hunting and maintenance invitees, Richards' expressed concern
about the Howard Group's use of the cabin on Gillmor property in Section 25 is also
addressed to some degree, because not just every invitee can use that route for every
purpose.

5

Opening Brief at 8, fl 9. There is also Richards' admission on cross-examination at trial
that he was not even concerned with the numbers of people accompanying Gillmor
along the easements, instead, his concern was with the numbers of people
accompanying the Vern Howard Group, a concern that was expressly addressed by the
"public domain,, limitation. Tr. 1029:20-24.
Fourth, Defendants point to prior drafts to argue they support a finding that
paragraph 3(a)'s access was to be limited. To the contrary, the change between the
11/15/85 draft, Defendants' Exhibit 332, and the 11/20/85 draft, Defendants' Exhibit
310, proves just the opposite. While Defendants choose to focus on a "list" of approved
uses in the 11/15/85 draft that they objected to and that do not appear in the 11/20/85
draft or final Agreement, they omit to discuss the salient change. The "list" of approved
uses in the prior draft was entirely replaced with the broad and unfettered grant in
paragraph 3(a) of the use for access to the Gillmor property, with no restrictions of any
kind.6
Fifth, there is the practical and common sense consideration that a person
owning such a beautiful, pristine and recreational property would naturally desire to

6

lndeed, as discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief, Mr. Elegante, who authored
the change, testified that it was made because Frank Gillmor would not agree with the
approach Elegante had initiated in the negotiations, of listing allowed uses, because
there were so many uses that had been made historically. Elegante realized the error
of his negotiating strategy and changed the next draft to reflect Gillmor's expressed
intent to have a broad grant of access. Richards admitted at trial that the change made
by Mr. Elegante was not further negotiated after it was proposed. This testimony is not
only uncontroverted, and the sole evidence aside from the plain language of the
Agreement of Frank Gillmor's intent on the issue, it was unchallenged in any respect by
any evidence, is corroborated by the change in the drafts, themselves, by the final,
agreed, Agreement and is also essentially conceded by Defendants on page 3 of
Appellee's Brief: "James Elegante represented Gillmor and was the primary drafter of
the Agreement."
6

the "reasonable expectations" test Defendants espouse on page 8 of their brief, for
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Defendants ignore what Frank actually gave up in compromise, arguing insteau for

rr••;) n o s t significantly. Frank essentially gave up virtually all of his access rights c

7

SeeTL

103:18-22; 146 (?-B.

"' .

'• ' "

8

"

This was a significant concession, because their was no question that Neil
Creek Road w a s by far and away the more improved and better quality road. Dep. of
Vein Howard at 60:16-18. Still, having obtained the express right to make any
improvements reasonably necessary to the Perdue Creek Road, he was willing to let
that be his primary access,
7

Frank gave up expressly as concessions all of the limitations in paragraph 6 of the
Agreement, which limitations did not exist prior to the Agreement. Frank also limited
some of his access along Perdue Creek Road to vehicular access. Finally, Frank
expressly limited himself to a scope of use that would not be so great that the
easements would fall into the "public domain." Objectively assessed under a
"reasonable expectations" standard, these concessions are substantial, essentially
giving up one entire access to Richards, along Neil Creek Road in exchange for agreed
unfettered access on the Perdue Creek Road, except for the express restrictions in the
Agreement. Neither Gillmor nor any successor in interest could have reasonable
expectations that a further, unwritten, layer of limitations would be imposed.
II.

DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS O N THE CHALLENGED FINDINGS FAIL.

A.

Findings 3 and 4.

As to the conduct under Shields' lease to Bertagnole, Defendants point to no
evidence other than Richards' conversations with Bertagnole. That evidence must be
excluded pursuant to Gillmor's hearsay objections unless its admission is limited to
show, not that the statements are true, but only that they represented Richards' belief,
to the extent that has any relevance. The finding should reflect that distinction.
As to Finding No. 4, Defendants concede that the evidence could only have
been admitted to show Richards' belief, and not the truth of the hearsay statements, so
the finding should reflect that.
B.

Finding No. 18.

Defendants point to "[t]he deletion of language in drafts of an agreement" as the
principal evidentiary support for the finding. An early draft contained an express
acknowledgment in paragraph 2 that "one residence may be constructed upon the
8

Gillmor Property, and that the occupant of such residence shall have the right to use
the easement for access to such residence." The change in the November 15,1985
"mark-up" that Richards' attorney made, see Exhibit 332, notes that a "cabin" is
"existing" and changes the characterization from "residence" to "cabin."
There is no dispute that the issue about the cabin or residence in paragraph 2
dealt with the Vern Howard Group. The question of the Vern Howard Group's right to
access the Gillmor property along the easements was resolved in the final draft, with
the language: "Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is acknowledged by Richards that there
is one cabin on the Gillmor Property, and that the occupant of such cabin shall have the
right to use the Easements for access to such cabin." This language offers no
restriction on access by Gillmor for construction of a cabin for himself in the future. Yet
Richards knew full well how to put in specific restrictions he desired, and which Gillmor
would in fact agree to, such as paragraph 6 of the Agreement. The effort to suggest
that the change in language in paragraph 2 was an agreement to limit Gillmor's own
access is therefore not sustainable. Moreover, it is clear that Gillmor in fact retained
the intent to build a cabin in the future, something that the change Elegante made, and
which Richards signed, allowed him to do. Tr. 216:12-217:13 (testimony of Elegante).
The change in the written document does not support Richards1 interpretation
because the entire concept of a "list" of "approved activities" on the Gillmor property had
been replaced with the very clear, broad and unfettered grant of access. Since
Richards accepted the change and signed the Agreement as changed, he is stuck with
the breadth of the Agreement that he admitted on cross-examination he understood.
There is simply no substantial evidence supporting such a finding of mutual
assent that access would be restricted in such a manner. Gillmor in fact had originally
9

built a cabin on Neil Creek Road in Section 24, which cabin had burned down, so the
historical use of the easements clearly contemplated some cabin building. In light of
the admission of Richards' attorney that the Agreement was not intended to restrict in
any way the historical use, no rational construction of the language in the final
Agreement could point in the direction of such a restriction.
C.

Finding No. 23.

Gillmor challenges only the following portion of Finding No. 23: "[t]here is no
evidence that either Frank Gillmor or David Richards were aware of the use of the four
wheelers before they signed the Agreement." See Finding No. 23. Gillmor is at a loss
as to what evidence defendants contend she is supposed to marshal in support of this
finding. Where the trial court has found that "no evidence" exists, there is simply no
evidence to be marshaled.9
On the other hand, as discussed in more detail below, the trial court's finding that
"no evidence" exists is erroneous and contrary to the evidence, as it ignores Frank
Gillmor's business records, and ignores the two-hundred year old legal presumption
that a person reads letters which he receives through the mail.
D.

Finding No. 26.

Defendants' assertions in the argument portion of their brief that Gillmor did not

9

Similarly, Defendants assert that "Gillmor has failed even to begin to marshal
the evidence supporting the trial court's conclusions that the provision [of the
Agreement discussing three-wheeled All Terrain Vehicles and motorized dirt bikes] was
ambiguous . . . " Defendants' Brief at 28. However, the law is clear that "[w]hether a
contract is ambiguous is a question of law, which [the appellate court] review[s] for
correctness." Peterson v. The SunriderCorp., 48 P.3d 918, 924 (Utah 2002). Because
the trial court's conclusion that this particular provision of the Agreement was
ambiguous is a question of law, Gillmor is not required to marshal the evidence
supporting that conclusion.
10

marshal the evidence supporting this finding are hollow, and are contradicted by their
earlier tacit acknowledgment that Gillmor in fact marshaled the evidence. See, e.g.,
Defendants' Brief at 22-23. Further, Gillmor does not dispute, and expressly indicated
in her opening brief, that "Richards, his attorney, Workman, and Elegante all testified
they were unaware of four-wheeled ATVs." Opening Brief at 17.
With respect to the portion of Finding No. 26 that Frank Gillmor was unaware of
four-wheeled ATVs, as discussed below the trial court's finding on this issue is contrary
to the evidence. Further, for the reasons discussed in Gillmor's opening brief, and as is
discussed in more detail below, the trial court's finding that Frank Gillmor would have
excluded four-wheeled ATVs from use on the easements had he known about them is
sheer speculation.
E.

Finding No. 49.

Defendants attempt to support Finding No. 49 with two items of evidence. First,
they point to paragraph 3(c) of the Agreement, and argue that such sub-paragraph
specifically deals with "invitees" and so its restriction to maintenance and hunting
invitees precludes any others from using the easements. This issue is discussed below
and will not be repeated here. The next snippet of evidence relied on by Defendants is
Richards' testimony that, had a more general grant been proposed, he would not have
accepted it. Defendants' Brief at 24. The fatal flaw in this testimony is that Richards
did in fact sign the Agreement, which contains the very broad and unfettered grant of
access in paragraph 3(a).

11

III.

DEFENDANTS5 ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE ISSUE O F FOUR-WHEELED

ATVs

MUST

BE REJECTED - THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT FOUR-WHEELED A T V S
CANNOT BE USED O N THE EASEMENT IS NOT CORRECT.

A.

Defendants' Arguments Concerning the Trial Court's Denial of
Summary Judgment Ignore the Applicable Rules of Contract
Construction.

Defendants assert that the trial court's denial of summary judgment was proper
because, according to defendants, there are allegedly two reasonable interpretations of
the contract term "three-wheel motorized All Terrain Vehicles or any two-wheeled
motorcycles or motorized 'dirt bikes'..." However, this Court has recently reiterated
the black letter principle that "[a] contract provision is not necessarily ambiguous just
because one party gives that provision a different meaning than another party does. To
demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable."
Novell, Inc. v. The Canopy Group, Inc., 92 P.3d 768, 774 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (quoting
R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997)).10
Here, the interpretation which defendant David Richards offered in opposition to
Gillmor's motion for summary was not tenable and, therefore, as a matter of law, could
not have created an ambiguity out of what is clearly unambiguous language.
Specifically, Richards asserted that, in his mind, the phrase "motorized 'dirt bikes'"
meant all types of all terrain vehicles, including four-wheeled ATVs.11 (R. at 1097:9-14).

10

This principle applies regardless of whether a trial court is interpreting a
contract on summary judgment or at trial. See, e.g., Novell, 92 P.3d 768 (affirming
grant of summary judgment where defendant's proffered interpretation of contract was
not tenable).
11

ln their brief, Defendants point the court to other "evidence" they submitted in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, including articles from current trade
magazines which the Maceys submitted. However, it was improper for the trial court to
consider such evidence in determining whether an ambiguity existed, inasmuch as the
relevant inquiry involved "looking] to all the attendant circumstances surrounding the
12

This proposed interpretation (which the trial court later rejected after trial) was
untenable for several reasons. First, the presence of the term "three-wheeled All
Terrain Vehicles" makes it clear that the term "dirt bikes" referred to a type of vehicle
other than a three-wheeled or four wheeled all terrain vehicle. Second, the
uncontroverted testimony of James Elegante, the attorney who drafted the term "dirt
bikes," was that the term "dirt bikes" referred to a specific type of motorcycle designed
for off road use. (R. at 185:3-13).
Third, as Gillmor argued in support of her motion for summary judgment, "the
ordinary meaning of contract terms is often best determined through standard, nonlegal dictionaries." Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed, Sav. & Loan Ass'n^ 899 P.2d 779,
782 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Here, Gillmor submitted to the trial court definitions from at
least eleven (11) different dictionaries demonstrating that the term "dirt bikes" referred
to a specific type of motorcycle. (See R. at 918-920). Defendants were unable to offer
a single dictionary definition which supported Richards' proposed interpretation. Such
fact demonstrates that Richards' proposed interpretation was untenable. The trial
court's adoption of an untenable interpretation of the term "dirt bikes" in denying
summary judgment was not correct. Thus, the trial court's ruling on this issue must be
reversed and summary judgment entered in favor of Gillmor.
B.

Even Assuming, Arguendo, The Trial Court's Conclusion On
Summary Judgment That The Phrase At Issue Is Ambiguous Was
Correct, The Trial Court Erred When It Concluded That The
Agreement Bars The Use Of Four-Wheeled ATVs On The Easement

The law is clear that "if after considering [extrinsic] evidence, the court

execution of the document..." Novell, 92 P.3d at 774. Thus, evidence of facts that
may have existed in the year 2002 were irrelevant to the circumstances in the Fall of
1985.
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determines that the language of the contract is not ambiguous, then the parties1
intentions must be determined solely from the language of the contract." Peterson v.
The SunriderCorp., 48 P.3d 918, 925 (Utah 2002) (quoting Ward v. Intermountain
Farmers'Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995)). Here, after considering the extrinsic
evidence presented at trial, the trial court expressly rejected the interpretation offered
by Richards, finding that "there is no persuasive evidence that the term 'dirt bikes' in the
Agreement refers to ATVs. In fact, the evidence suggests, albeit not conclusively, that
'dirt bikes' were specifically included to prohibit use of the noisy and highly
maneuverable light motorcycles that Richards found annoying in the vicinity of his
cabin, and that they were prohibited in addition to three wheel ATVs." (Finding No. 25).
Once the trial court rejected Richards' proposed interpretation, Gillmor's
proposed interpretation was the only remaining interpretation. That being the case, the
contractual provision was clear and unambiguous, and it was error for the trial court to
then go beyond the four corners of the Agreement and consider additional extrinsic
evidence of the parties' intent. See Peterson, 48 P.3d at 268.
Even assuming, arguendo, that it was appropriate for the trial court to consider
extrinsic evidence of Richards' and Frank Gillmor's intent, after having rejected
Richards' proposed interpretation of the term "dirt bikes," the trial court erred by
speculating as to what Richards' and Frank Gillmor would have done had they known
about four-wheeled ATVs at the time they signed the Agreement.
In the first instance, the trial court erred by concluding that Frank Gillmor did not
know about four-wheeled ATVs. With respect to this issue, Defendants accuse Gillmor
of not having marshaled the evidence. However, where the trial court found that
"[tjhere is no evidence that either Frank Gillmor or David Richards were aware of the
14

use of the four wheelers before they signed the Agreement^]" (Finding No. 23), there is
simply no evidence to marshal.
In finding that there was "no evidence" on this issue, the trial court ignored
certain letters which were admitted into evidence as Frank Gillmor's own business
records, and ignored and failed to apply the legal presumption that Frank Gillmor had
read those letters.12
The trial court erred by not applying this legal presumption. Given the legal
presumption that Frank Gillmor read the letters he received from Vern Howard (and
which were admitted as Frank Gillmor's own business records), it was erroneous for the
trial court to conclude that there was no evidence that Frank Gillmor was aware of the
existence of four-wheeled ATVs when he signed the Agreement on 21 November 1985.
Because of the presumption that Frank Gillmor read the Vern Howard letters, and
therefore knew about four-wheeled ATVs, the trial court also erred by concluding that

12

Specifically, the trial court admitted, as business records, letters which
everybody concedes were drafted and mailed by, and received from, Vern Howard.
See, e.g., Exhibits 24R and 25R. Those letters, dated June 25, 1985 and September
23, 1985, respectively, expressly refer to four-wheeled ATVs, and how useful the
Howards found them to be in performing their work for Frank Gillmor. See id.
There is no dispute that those letters were in fact received. Indeed, they were
admitted into evidence as Frank Gillmor's business records. Further, courts long ago
made it clear that "[i]t is a natural and reasonable presumption that a man who receives
a letter on important business reads it." Crescent Mfg. Co. v. Patterson Mfg. Co., 195
F. 382, 386 (4th Cir. 1912). See also Sylvester v. Armstrong, 84 P.2d 729, 732 (Wyo.
1938) (u[i]n the ordinary course of business, however, it is customary for men who
receive a letter, especially by first class mail, to read it, and many presumptions or
inferences arise from such ordinary course of affairs"); The President, Directors, and
Company of Hartford Bank v. Hart, 3 Day 491,
, 3 Am. Dec. 274 (Conn. 1807)
("putting a letter into the post-office affords a fair presumption, that it was received, and
read, by the person to whom it was directed").
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Frank Gillmor would have excluded four-wheeled ATVs had he known about them.13
Even assuming the trial court did not err by concluding that Frank Gillmor was
not aware of four-wheeled ATVs at the time he signed the Agreement, the trial court's
conclusion (Finding No. 26) that Frank Gillmor would have excluded four-wheeled ATVs
from use on the easements is sheer speculation. Defendants' assertions that Gillmor
did not marshal the evidence on this issue must be rejected.14
Further, that the trial court's conclusion on this issue is speculation is
demonstrated by the fact that the trial court upheld an objection on grounds of
speculation when Elegante was asked what might have been done in the Agreement if
four-wheeled ATVs were known. Tr. 203:8-204:9 (Elegante Testimony). Where the
trial court concluded it would be speculation for Elegante to testify as to how the parties
would have handled four-wheeled ATVs in the Agreement had they known about them,
it cannot substitute its own speculation to say how the parties would have handled fourwheeled ATVs in the Agreement.
The trial court also erred by not finding that the doctrine of practical construction
demonstrates that four-wheeled ATVs are not excluded under the Agreement First,

13

Defendants point out that the trial court concluded that Gillmor's testimony was
not credible on certain other issues and, therefore, did not accept her testimony that
she read the letters with Frank. However, not one aspect of Gillmor's opening brief
relied on any of Nadine Gillmor's own trial testimony. Further, regardless of whether
the trial court did or did not accept Nadine Gillmor's testimony, Defendants cannot point
this Court to any evidence in the record which would overcome the legal presumption
that Frank Gillmor read the Vern Howard letters.
14

For example, in her opening brief, Gillmor expressly indicated that "Richards,
his attorney, Workman, and Elegante all testified they were unaware of four-wheeled
ATVs." Opening Brief at 17. With respect to the trial court's conclusion in Finding No.
26 that Frank Gillmor was unaware of four-wheeled ATVs, as set forth above the
Court's findings on that issue are not correct.
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the trial court, as Defendants do in their brief, ignored the undisputed testimony of Tom
and Craig Howard that at all times after the Agreement was signed, and
notwithstanding Frank Gillmor's instructions that they could no longer park their vehicles
at the bottom of the easements but were to trailer their ATVs to the Gillmor property,
the Howards continued to ride their four-wheeled ATVs on the easements.15 See, e.g.,
Tr. at 562:1-564:23, 560:24-571:17 (Testimony of Tom Howard); Tr. 608:22-610:3,
613:13-614:1, 620:15-624:10 (Testimony of Craig Howard).
Second, the trial court, as Defendants again do in their brief, ignored the
undisputed testimony that Doc Woolstenhulme was Richards' agent in charge of
Richards' property, that Richards never told Woolstenhulme that four-wheeled ATVs
could not be used on the easements, that Woolstenhulme, on numerous occasions,
saw Gillmor's invitees riding four-wheeled ATVs on the easements, and that
Woolstenhulme never objected or otherwise told Gillmor's invitees that four-wheeled
ATVs could not be used on the easements. See, e.g., Tr. 374:1-375:6 (Testimony of
Doc Woolstenhulme) (cited in Gillmor's Opening Brief at 8, fl 8).
The trial court's conclusion that the Agreement precludes Gillmor from using
four-wheeled ATVs on the easements is not correct, not supported by the evidence,
and must be reversed.
IV.

T H E DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO A M E N D W A S A N ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

Richards has consistently taken the position that the plain language of the
Agreement leads to results he did not intend or "would not have accepted" because

15

Defendants assert in their brief that, with respect to these facts, Gillmor failed
to provide citations to the record in her opening brief. That assertion is not accurate.
See, e.g., Gillmor's Opening Brief at 7-8, fl 8.
17

there would be too many potential users of the easements. See, e.g., Defendants' Brief
at 24. The evidence is clear that Frank was simply unwilling to have his rights
narrowed. Gillmor's Opening Brief at 13. Thus, to the extent that the trial court
departed from the plain language of the Agreement and adopted the asserted
intentions of one party that were contrary to the intentions of the other party, the issue
is raised about a lack of mutual assent.
The only way to avoid the raising of such an issue is to interpret the Agreement
in accordance with its plain language, and bind both parties to the common meaning
and legal significance of the words used. In drawing its conclusions, the trial court
chose interpretations of intent from one side or the other that had concededly not been
negotiated and agreed by both. The sole remedy under those circumstances is to
rescind due to a lack of mutual assent, which is the claim that the proposed amendment
would have asserted, in order to allow the parties to go back to the point of litigating the
prescriptive rights claims that was supposed to be settled.
It is plainly prejudicial to rule that Gillmor cannot seek to undo entirely the
settlement premised upon an agreement as to which there is no mutual assent.
Therefore, if, in fact, the Agreement is not to be construed in accordance with its plain
language, such that palpable factual disputes exist as to whether both sides understood
and agreed to the material provisions that the trial court is interpreting, it is prejudicial
and an abuse of discretion to remove the possibility of asserting a rescission claim by
denying the motion to amend.
The three-month time limit of

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1) is not an impediment, for

two reasons. First, Gillmor sought to set aside the dismissal of the prescriptive rights
case not by Rule 60(b) motion in the original action, but in an independent action.
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Second, even if Rule 60 applied, the applicable provision is Rule 60(b)(6), because
justice requires that such issues be addressed where Richards for the first time in 16
years has raised a question of the plain meaning of the Agreement, after Gillmor had
been acting in a contrary fashion during that time. Rule 60(b)(6) motions must be made
within a "reasonable time" and a reasonable time would have to be measured from the
date that a dispute about mutual assent first appeared.
V.

THE FACT THAT CERTAIN ISSUES MAY HAVE BEEN RAISED BELOW DOES NOT MEAN
THAT THE TRIAL COURT CAN ISSUE ADVISORY OPINIONS.

In response to Gillmor's arguments concerning certain advisory opinions
rendered by the trial court, Defendants argue that the issues were raised before the trial
court and that, therefore, the issues were automatically ripe for decision. However, it is
axiomatic that the mere fact a party raises an issue does not mean the issue is
necessarily ripe for decision. See, e.g., Boyle v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P.2d
595, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("[b]ecause plaintiffs' action was not ripe for adjudication,
the trial court was barred, as a matter of law, from rendering declaratory judgment").
For the reasons set forth in Gillmor's opening brief, the trial court's conclusions and
judgment about corporate owners, consortiums, limits for numbers of hunters on the
Gillmor property who access the Gillmor property via the easements (as opposed to the
number of hunters on the easement, itself), the convoying of vehicles,16 and even
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With respect to the issue of convoys, Defendants assert the issue was ripe
because Gillmor raised the issue in the memorandum she filed in support of her motion
to alter or amend the judgment. While it is true Gillmor raised the issue in her
memorandum, she did so only to point out to the trial court that certain of its rulings
were incorrect because it was possible to envision future factual scenarios which would
conceivably allow Gillmor (or subsequent owners) to engage in certain conduct which
would be allowable under the trial court's interpretation of the Agreement, but which
would impose more of a burden on the easements than would some of the conduct
which the trial court ruled was prohibited under the Agreement. Raising an issue in
19

prohibitions against construction generally (as opposed to Gillmor replacing the cabin
she had) are all impermissible advisory opinions.

RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL
I.

T H E UNFETTERED G R A N T O F A C C E S S R U N S W I T H T H E L A N D A N D A P P L I E S T O
NADINE GILLMOR.

The grant of an easement right of access to Frank Gillmor "and his immediate
family to the first degree of consanguinity, and their spouses and children," [hereinafter
the "Easement Granted to a Class"]: (1) runs with the land ; and (2) was clearly
designed to exclude from the grant, specifically, other Gillmor family members who had
been decreed to have prescriptive rights of access under the partition decree, so they
could not claim rights under the express easement.
Defendants' attempt to contort this provision of the paragraph 3(a) grant of
access beyond all recognition. Their basic assertion in support of their arguments is
that Richards was very concerned about the numbers of people who would use the
easements, so he demanded that the grant of an easement to the Gillmor family be
limited to a personal right, inuring only to Frank Gillmor and his then-existing two
daughters, and no other persons.
The starting point to reveal the irrationality of this argument is Richards' own
admission at trial, on cross-examination, that his real concern was with the numbers of
people in the Howard Group, and that he was unconcerned about the numbers of
people who went up to the Gillmor property with Gillmor. There is simply no rational

such a context is a far cry from having the factual predicates which are necessary for an
issue to be ripe for decision.
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way to square that testimony with a concern to make the paragraph 3(a) right "personal"
or to restrict the type of invitees whom Gillmor had historically had on the property.
The provision must be construed in light of Richards' admission that the numbers
of people going up with the Gillmors were not a concern when the Agreement was
signed. The provision must also be construed in light of the express mandate of
paragraph 4 that the provisions of the Agreement run with the land:
The exclusive nature of the Easements herein granted and the
limitations on use herein contained are declared by the parties
hereto to be covenants and restrictions which run with and are
appurtenant to the Gillmor Property and the Richards Property,
herein described, and shall be binding upon and shall inure to the
benefit of all present and future owners and/or purchasers,
occupants and lessees of said Properties.
Agreement fl 4. The trial court found that it "was the intention of the parties that all
covenants should run with the land . . .." Findings of Fact fl 49. This finding is
supported by paragraph 4 of the Agreement.
Moreover, the Agreement, on its face, plainly states that it was "for access by
Gillmor and his immediate family to the first degree of consanguinty [sic], and their
spouses and children . . . . " Agreement at fi 33(a). The term "their spouses and
children" clearly refers to both Frank and his immediate family members. Because
Nadine was Frank's spouse, the plain language of the Agreement gives her a right of
access.
The burdens and benefits created by the Agreement, and specifically the grant of
an easement to Gillmor, relate to the Gillmor land and the ownership of an interest in it
and of an interest in the easements. There is thus no question that the grant of the
easement "touches and concerns" the land. The burden is imposed on Richards' rights
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in his land, as a landowner, and the burden therefore runs with the land and diminishes
its value. See Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 624
(Utah 1989). Richards' grant of the easement to use his land establishes a mutuality of
estate in the same land between covenanting parties, so as to establish privity. See id.
at 628. Thus, the only legal conclusion available is that the grant of the easement runs
with the land and may be enjoyed fully by Gillmor's successors.
What purpose does the distinction of Frank's family members to the first degree
of consanguinity serve, in light of Richards admission that he was unconcerned with the
numbers of people Frank brought on the property? The answer to that question is
established by the Decree of Partition through which Frank obtained his sole ownership
of his property. The Partition Decree, Exhibit 2, in paragraph 14, which addresses the
larger parcel of property from which Frank obtained what he owned in 1985, expressly
reserved to Florence Gillmor and Edward L. Gillmor, after the partition, their prescriptive
easement rights to use Perdue Creek Road and Neil Creek Road. See id. at 23-24.
Prudence would require that the express easement exclude by classification the other
Gillmor family members from the family members who received the grant, lest they be
able to argue under the partition decree some right also in the express easement that
settled Frank Gillmor's claims of prescriptive rights.
With respect to Defendants' argument that Gillmor had other access to his land,
a fact objected to at trial as irrelevant in interpreting an express easement, which
objection the trial judge overruled, the evidence established that Gillmor had no legal
right of access other than Perdue Creek Road and Neil Creek Road, and that any other
access required permission of various landowners over whose properties the access
ran.
22

II.

T H E OCCUPANTS OF THE CABIN" W E R E EXPRESSLY GRANTED A N EASEMENT.

The plain language of paragraph 2 grants an easement to the "occupant of the
cabin" for purposes of accessing the cabin. Paragraph 2 contains no limitation on that
access right other than the "public domain" restriction. The historical use of the Gillmor
Property by the occupant of the cabin clearly included general recreation. Defendants
argue that such use was at a different partition cabin, accessed by White's Basin Road.
See Defendants' Brief at 57. Regardless of what route was taken or where the original
cabin was located, Richards was aware of the Howard Group and that Gillmor
compensated them by giving access to his property in exchange for work they did. Tr.
at 322:10-19; 1268:4-14. In the absence of an express restriction, it would be
contemplated that they did the same things they did before, including general recreation
with their families. It is significant to note that the new cabin was constructed using the
Perdue Creek Road for access. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding.
References to "mostly" work-related activities and "occasional" picnics with the family,
as set forth in Defendants' Brief at 58-59 are enough to support the finding entered,
because they prove without doubt that the activity was not strictly work-related.
III.

T H E TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT PARAGRAPH 6 O F T H E AGREEMENT
REFERS T O " H U N T E R S " IS CORRECT.

Defendants assert that the trial court's ruling that "18 hunters" and not "18
persons" may use the easement under paragraph 6 of the Agreement is erroneous, and
that this issue is important because Gillmor has, according to defendants, routinely
flouted paragraph 6's limitation of 18 hunters and 6 vehicles. Defendants are wrong on
both accounts, and grossly distort the record.
The trial court's ruling that paragraph 6 refers to 18 "hunters" is consistent with
23

the plain language of the Agreement, which provides that Gillmor "shall not allow more
than 18 persons and six vehicles to use the easements for hunting purposes at any
time." Agreement, fl 6 (emphasis added). By definition, a hunter is the only person
who could use the easement "for hunting purposes." A person who is not a hunter,
such as a minor child or a spouse who is not hunting, but who may be accompanying a
hunter, is not using the easement "for hunting purposes." The trial court's use of the
term "hunter" is perfectly consistent with the plain language of the Agreement.17
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the relief Gillmor seeks in her appeal should be
granted and Defendant appeal denied.

17

Defendants' assertion that Gillmor routinely flouts the 18 hunter, 6 vehicle
limitation, such that "during any given hunting season, there are far more than 18
people and six vehicles using the Perdue Creek road for accessf,]" (Defendants' Brief at
59-60) misstates, and is not supported by, the record. The only evidence defendants
cite as support for this assertion is Ken Macey's testimony that on a single instance he
saw nine vehicles on the easement. A single occurrence, however, is a far cry from
defendants' assertion that it happens every hunting season.
More important than the fact that Macey testified about only a single instance, is
the fact that Macey also testified that he stopped those vehicles, asked the occupants
what they were doing, was told they were going to go hunting on the Gillmor property,
and then, without objection, let them proceed. (R. 2015, p. 1156). Where Macey, with
full knowledge of the Agreement, including the limitations imposed by paragraph 6 of
the Agreement, allowed the nine vehicles to proceed, without objection, to the Gillmor
property, Macey intentionally and deliberately waived the numerical limitations of
paragraph 6. See, e.g., In re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, U 30, 71 P.3d 589, 599
("waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. .. [and] may be express or
implied").
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